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Abstract 
 
The Caster Semenya debacle touched off by the 2009 Berlin World Athletics Championships resulted 
finally in IOC and IAAF abandonment of sex testing, which gave way to procedures that make 
female competition eligibility dependent upon the level of serum testosterone, which must be below 
the male range or instrumentally countered by androgen resistance. We argue that the new policy is 
unsustainable because (i) the testosterone-performance connection it posits is uncompelling; (ii) 
testosterone-induced female advantage is not ipso facto unfair advantage; (iii) the new policy 
reflects the gender policing impulses endemic to sport as well as the broader cultural impulses to 
monstrify women and to doctor women who have nothing wrong with them; (iv) female-male 
performance disparities are not the only reason for sex-segregated sport, but co-exist with 
respectable cultural and practical reasons, which (v) provide a powerful case for allowing athletes to 
compete in the sex category congruent with their gender identity.    
 
KEYWORDS Sex categorization; Eligibility; Gender Ideology; Fairness. 
 
Introduction 
 
The majority of sports are sex-segregated. That is, men compete with men only and women 
compete with women only. Resultant concerns about fraud and fairness have elicited sex testing of 
putatively female athletes since at least 1936, when ad hoc testing took place at the Berlin 
Olympics (Heggie, 2010; Tucker and Collins, 2010). The test has an uneven history, involving a 
variety of procedures,1 false positives2 and personal degradation (and worse).3 The variety of 
procedures and the false positives reflect the well-documented absence of a singular marker of 
sex.4 And the personal degradation courted was thrown into sharp relief by messy and protracted 
affair touched off by Caster Semenya’s win in the 2009 World Athletics Championships in Berlin. 
This catalysed the end of formal sex testing by the IOC and IAAF, each of whom inaugurated a new 
policy of eligibility for female competition. We consider whether the new policy, which replaces the 
supposed test of sex with examination of testosterone levels, is an improvement upon the old one 
or replicates old problems of rationale and ideology. We conclude that the new approach is 
problematic too, and finish by arguing that there is, in the final summation, a strong case, 
incorporating performance and cultural elements, for allowing performers to compete in the sex 
category which aligns with their gender identity.   
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New IAAF and IOC Policies 
 
The IAAF subsequently published new regulations governing the eligibility of female athletes 
with hyperandrogenism (HA), a term used to describe the excessive production of androgenic 
hormones in females (IOC April 2011; IAAF May 2011).5 Shortly after, just weeks ahead of the 
opening ceremony for the London Olympics, the IOC issued equivalent regulations.  They stated 
that: ‘…these Regulations are designed to identify circumstances in which a particular athlete will 
not be eligible (by reason of hormonal characteristics) to participate in 2012 OG competitions in the 
female category’ (IOC June 2012).6 According to the IOC and IAAF regulations, an athlete should be 
eligible to compete in female competitions provided that: 
 
(i) The athlete’s androgen level, measured by the serum concentration of testosterone, is 
below the male range; 
(ii) The athlete has androgen levels within the male range, but she has an androgen resistance 
such that she derives no competitive advantage from such levels.7 
 
Ostensibly the new policy signals an end to sporting bodies’ attempts to ‘make any 
determination of sex’ (IOC June 2012).8 The IAAF highlighted the fact that the HA policy ‘abandoned 
all reference to the terminology ‘gender verification’ and ‘gender policy’ in its Rules’ (IAAF May 
2011).9 The disuse of the term sex (or gender) verification could be read as an appreciation of the 
preceding fact that sex is, at least partly, socially determined. Also, that sex cannot be readily 
delimited into the binary categories male and female.10  
 
A conspicuous feature of the new policy is the way in which potential cases of athletes with 
HA are identified. The IAAF policy cites several ways in which an athlete may be requested to 
undergo evaluation for HA (Karkazis et al., 2012). The first requires an athlete who has previously 
been diagnosed with HA to notify medical officials so that her case can be evaluated in accordance 
with the new regulations (IAAF 2011). The second involves the investigation of a female athlete if 
the IAAF Medical Manager has ‘reasonable grounds for believing that a case of hyperandrogenism 
may exist’ (IAAF 2011).11 According to the new regulations the medical manager’s reasonable 
grounds ‘may be derived from any reliable source’, which includes ‘information received by the 
IAAF Medical Delegate or other responsible medical official at a competition’ (IAAF 2011).12 
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Similarly, under the IOC policy a request for a female hyperandrogenism investigation can be made 
by: 
 
i. an athlete who is concerned about personal symptoms of hyperandrogenism 
ii. a Chief NOC Medical Officer 
iii. an IOC Medical Commission member or OCOG Medical Officer  
iv. the Chairman. 
 
Requests must include the reasons and basis for an investigation, ‘including any evidence which 
might suggest that an athlete may have female hyperandrogenism’ (IOC 2012)13. In considering 
how investigations are brought about, Karkazis et al. (2012) are right to focus attention on the 
means used to identify individual athletes for testing. Given that ‘anyone can make their concerns 
about an athlete known to an IAAF medical director’ (Karkazis et al., 2012, 13), the HA regulations 
remain, at least to some degree, suspicion-based. 
 
New Policy, Old Stories? 
 
Considering the history of sex testing in elite sport, claims that the procedures outlined in 
the HA policy are nothing to do with determining sex seem misleading at best. The new rules still 
function as a way of determining who can compete as a woman in sporting competition and who 
cannot. In place of chromosomes or genotype, the level of serum testosterone is used to determine 
when a female athlete is too masculine (manly) (Crincoli, 2011). Worryingly, therefore, the aim of 
the new policy is to ‘clarify whether women with this condition [excessive androgen levels+ are “too 
masculine” to compete with other women’ (Karkazis et al., 2012, 3). This immediately smells of the 
pervasive gender policing in women’s sports, of which Karkazis et al. (2012) fear intensification, 
14and seems also to speak to older, structurally related ideological perspectives and mythological 
hang-ups, sketched immediately below. 
 
Ideology, Myth and ‘Freakish’ Female Competitors 
 
One of the most conspicuous qualities of the discourse in this area is the asymmetries of 
conceptualisation and response generated by unusually prolific male performers such as Usain Bolt 
and female counterparts such as Caster Semenya. The former are phenomenal and the latter are at 
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best suspicious and at worst monstrous; the former inspire awe and the latter eerie alarm and 
sometimes disgust. The pattern is not a new one, with Semenya perhaps merely the latest and 
most extreme example. Indeed, tennis legend Martina Navratilova – unusually strong and powerful 
by the standards of the era’s female tennis – first incited a precise loathing which is shamelessly 
expunged from the narrative of her career now typically offered by the British mainstream media. 
Roscoe Tanner, a male big hitter and 1979 Wimbledon Singles finalist, was extraordinary whilst 
Navratilova was at best dodgy. This asymmetry seems to find an echo in the fact that while the new 
IAAF and IOC policies stipulate an upper testosterone limit for female competitors, there is no 
equivalent for their male counterparts. Indeed, as Crincoli (2011, 3) puts it, ‘…there isn’t even a 
concept of excessiveness or having ‘too much’ when it comes to men naturally producing 
androgens’. 
 
The explanation for the preceding asymmetries probably has several components, which we 
don’t claim to catalogue here. Perhaps the most obvious concerns what Rebecca Lock has 
felicitously characterised as the ‘heterosexually successful’ female. Lock (2003) is referring, not to 
women who have strong heterosexual appetites or lots of great heterosexual sex, but to those who 
satisfy contingent normative standards of female heterosexual attractiveness, standards which look 
uneasily upon untypical muscularity, facial hair and the sort of physical capacities which would 
inspire awe in a male counterpart. A constituency of sportswomen, including Navratilova and 
Semenya, conspicuously fail to measure up to these standards of heterosexual success, the more 
unsettling for their apparent indifference to this supposed failure. And since heterosexuality itself is 
key to what Butler has called the ‘heterosexual matrix’ of sex, gender, heterosexual femininity and 
appearance, to be heterosexually unsuccessful is to fail at being a woman. And again, given the 
preceding staunch binary opposition which respectively conflates physical, psychological and social 
qualities, to be at once be a woman who fails to be a woman is culturally alarming, since one 
exposes that the constituents of the female side of the binary are not superglued but can instead 
be disaggregated. (The same goes, perhaps to a lesser extent, for men who fail to be men.) The 
heterosexually unsuccessful woman chafes against the heterosexual matrix, and therefore against 
culturally foundational ideals. She might be spared social obloquy if she can at least retain a certain 
reserve, but women such as Navratilova and Semenya spectacularly fail there too, since they wear 
their indifference to the heterosexual matrix on their sleeves. Navratilova is in fact a lesbian, but 
was heterosexually unsuccessful in any event and loathed before she came out. The new IAAF and 
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IOC policies seem to offer doubtful deliverance from this narrative, as Karkazis et al. (2012, 13) 
explain:  
 
It is troubling that more than half of the indicators of hyperandrogenism identified by the 
IAAF policy to determine which female athletes should undergo sex testing are entangled 
with deeply subjective and stereotypical Western deﬁnitions of femininity: “deep voice, 
breast atrophy, never menstruation (or loss of menses since several month), increased 
muscle mass, body hair of male type (vertex alopecia, > 17 years), Tanner score low (I/II), 
F&G score (>6 /! minimized by the beauty), no uterus, clitoromegaly [larger than typical 
clitoris+” *sic+ (IAAF 2011c, 20). Moreover, the IAAF notes (without support) that “the 
individuals concerned often display masculine traits and have an uncommon athletic 
capacity in relation to their fellow female competitors” (IAAF 2011c, 1). 
 
Moreover, the tendency to demonise heterosexually unsuccessful women offers attenuated 
examples of the more primal and global appetite for the monstrofication of women, of which 
Marina Warner (1994a: 4) has spoken:  
 
The she-monster’s hardly a new phenomenon. The idea of a female, untamed nature which 
must be leashed, or else will wreak havoc, closely reflects anthropological and mythological 
encounters with monsters … Greek myth alone offers a host of Keres, Harpies, Sirens, 
Moirae. Associated with fate and death in various ways, they move swiftly, sometimes on 
wings … and they seize, as in the word ‘raptor’.  
 
The sociocultural hostility towards women such as Navratilova and Semenya, who markedly and 
indifferently fail the tests of heterosexual femininity, is underwritten by these mythologised 
anxieties about female nature, themselves a robust part of the explanation of the norms of 
heterosexual femininity. Furthermore, the hostility and anxieties speak to overlapping fears of 
female duplicity, also given mythological representations. As Warner (1994a: 5) again elaborates,  
 
In the folklore of the past … the female beast … was sometimes cunning – and purposely 
concealed her true nature; the hero only learns that his beautiful lover Melusine turns into a 
serpent at the weekend by peeping at her; the sirens lured men with their deceitful songs … 
approaching St. Anthony for instance with honeyed words, hiding their diabolical nether 
parts under sumptuous dresses. Male beasts … don’t possess the same degree of duplicity: 
you can tell you’re dealing with the devil on the whole.15  
 
So the apparent woman might be a serpent, a monster or, as feared in the cases of Semenya and 
(more neurotically) Navratilova, a man. This in turn calls up the sombre face of the platonising 
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appetite behind the fierce attachment to the sex binary – she is either really a woman or, 
diabolically, really a man.16 However, the preceding fragility of the sex binary, alongside femininity-
indifferent women in sport and elsewhere, suggests that it would be more helpful and faithful to 
reality to tell some new stories here instead of repeating the old ones. The new IAAF and IOC 
policies, again, in their supposed rejection of sex testing, might seem to be telling a new story. But 
are they, and if so, is it one more worthy of acceptance? 
 
Furthermore, the immediately preceding hang-ups are continuous with the sociocultural 
appetite for doctoring women, including those who have no medical condition. The persisting 
practice of FGM is obvious illustration, and the new IAAF and IOC policies smell like others.17 
 
Finally, if it is true (more later), as the IAAF and IOC claim, that male competitive advantage 
is grounded finally in androgen production, upon which key performance-relevant qualities such as 
speed, strength and power are taken to rest (see IOC policy document), then sport’s role in the 
confirmation of male hegemony risks undermining by androgenic statistical outliers within the 
female athlete population. The most prestigious sports reward those qualities – speed, strength 
and power – in which men historically excel over women. This is impossible to detach from a 
broader cultural valorisation of these qualities, and accompanying downgrade of qualities, such as 
grace and balance, in which women historically excel over men. The absence of fears about females 
surreptitiously competing as males is eloquent of the assumption of male athletic superiority. 
Therefore, if a woman were to excel very untypically in speed, strength and power, and be 
accepted categorically as a woman, the ideological elevation of these qualities risks backfiring, since 
they might be exposed as less sex-indexed than presumed and so not the down payment on male 
hegemony which they are in turn presumed to be. Male hegemony might eventually face the Scylla 
and Charbydis of acceptance that masculine touchstones can be acquired by women and cessation 
of the ontological primacy of these current touchstones. The new IAAF and IOC policies suggest 
deliverance from this dilemma since, despite their disavowal of formal sex testing, the ideology 
which inscribes them, with its intolerance of androgenic overlap between the sexes, entails that 
hyperandrogenic female competitors are, as women, finally an apple or two short of a picnic.    
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Testosterone: Instrumental and Normative Status 
 
In this section we consider whether there is good reason to believe that testosterone carries 
the performative salience attributed by the new IAAF and IOC policies, and whether any advantage 
testosterone confers upon a female athlete is ipso facto an unfair advantage. 
 
Testosterone and Athletic Performance 
 
The assumption of a strong connection between testosterone and athletic performance is in 
fact problematic, for several reasons. First, as Karkazis et al. (2012, 8) put it, 
 
Individuals have dramatically different responses to the same amounts of testosterone, and 
testosterone is just one element in a complex neuroendocrine feedback system, which is 
just as likely to be affected by as to affect athletic performance.  
 
Indeed, Karkazis et al. (2012) invoke studies by McCaul et al. (1992) and Oliveira et al. (2009), which 
show that testosterone is raised among fans of winning teams and in experimental subjects 
randomly assigned to win. They similarly invoke studies by Bateup et al. (2002) and Edwards and 
O’Neal (2009), showing that both female and male athletes facing a competition have been 
consistently shown to experience a rise in testosterone, with the proviso that ‘…there are no data 
to suggest that precompetition testosterone levels predict an athlete’s performance on the field’ 
(Karkazis et al., 2012, 8). Moreover, women with CAIS (Complete Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome), 
whose tissues are completely unresponsive to testosterone, are overrepresented among elite 
athletes (Tucker and Collins 2010, 138). Again, in some cases there may be disadvantages that 
negate the presumed advantages enjoyed by female athletes with elevated testosterone levels. For 
example, women with CAH (Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia), whose testosterone levels are high, 
are vulnerable to short stature, obesity, dysregulation of mood hormones and excessive salt loss 
(Charmandari et al. 2004; Eugster et al. 2001; Meyer-Bahlburg 2011; Speiser and White 2003; 
Stikkelbroeck et al. 2003; Volkl et al. 2006). 
 
Again, nearly all research on testosterone and athletics has been conducted on men. There 
are findings which suggest that the specific mechanisms of testosterone’s action may be different 
for women than for men (MacLean et al., 2008). And, critically, as Karkazis et al. (2010, 8) again 
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point out, ‘there is a 10-fold gap in male and female endogenous testosterone levels, but smaller 
differences (including overlap) [a point to which we return] in virtually all aspects of athletic 
strength and performance’. Tucker and Collins (2010, 136-37) cite the eight races ranging between 
the 100m and the marathon at the 2009 IAAF Championships, which yield overlap between the 
male and female times in all but one race (10,000m). Karkazis et al. (2012, 8) note that: 
 
Many aspects of physique or athletic performance differ between males and females, often 
substantially; however, none of these is close to 10-fold, further underscoring the limitations 
of a straightforward comparison of average male–female differences in athletic performance 
to average male–female differences in testosterone levels.  
 
Finally, it is less than clear that testosterone carries the mental benefits for athletes which 
has been believed. Placebo-controlled studies show that increasing testosterone above minimal 
functional levels has no effects on mood, cognitive performance, libido or aggression (Bhasin et al. 
1996; Bhasin et al. 2001; Kvorning et al. 2006). 
 
Is Testosterone-Induced Advantage Unfair in Women’s Sport? 
 
The immediately preceding suggests that there is no robust connection between 
performance and testosterone level. Suppose, however, it is true that intersex conditions which 
result in HA confer an advantage; it would still be necessary to show why this should be considered 
an unfair advantage. Jones and Wilson (2009) identify three possible grounds used for 
distinguishing between fair and unfair advantages in competitive sports. The first is that advantages 
may be considered unfair ‘if they are not available to all competitors equally’ (Jones and Wilson 
2009, 127). That is, athletes with HA might have biological advantages which are not available to 
other female competitors. Current doping policy prevents athletes from taking anabolic steroids to 
elevate testosterone levels. But athletes with HA will have access to just those testosterone levels 
which current doping policy outlaws for the others. This line of reasoning fails the consistency test. 
Edwards (2008, 116) rightly points out that ‘advantages abound in sport’. There are several 
contingent facts about an athlete’s circumstances that ‘tilt the playing field’ (Buzuvis 2010, 39). For 
example, social and economic advantages bring a host of benefits, including access to high quality 
coaching, technologically superior equipment and excellent medical care. We also permit athletes 
to obtain physiological advantages through costly interventions such as laser eye surgery and 
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ligament replacement (Buzuvis, 2010). Not being available to everyone clearly couldn’t, without 
inconsistency, be regarded as constituting unfairness. 
 
A second principle of fairness distinguishes between advantages that are deserved and 
advantages that are undeserved. Again, inconsistency afflicts the argument that women advantaged 
by excessive levels of testosterone are unfairly advantaged since the advantage is not of their own 
making. Prevailing conceptions of fair play seem unconcerned about the effect of the ‘natural 
lottery’ (Jones and Wilson 2009; Edwards 2008; Loland 2002). It would be inconsistent to rule that 
genetic inequalities allegedly enjoyed by a smattering of female athletes confer an unfair advantage 
since advantages derived from other forms of ‘undeserved’ genetic variation are considered 
acceptable. As Jones and Wilson (2009, 128) point out in a related discussion, Usain Bolt’s stature is 
‘not of his own making, yet he is allowed to take maximum advantage of its benefits in 
competition’. Importantly, the ideal of fair play does not require us to level the athletic abilities of 
athletes. As Coggon, Hammond and Holm (2008, 6) maintain: 
 
….while the playing field should be level, the athletes must not be equal. If all were equal, 
there would be little to derive from competition, for everything would result in a draw or a 
win that was only the result of chance. 
 
In fact, any attempt to equalise competitors is not only undesirable but, given the reality of genetic 
and environmental variation, utterly impractical. 
 
The third argument, usually proposed in the anti-doping literature, is that advantages are unfair if 
they are somehow unnatural or artificial (Jones and Wilson 2009). The argument here might be that 
so-called disorders of sex development (DSD) give some athletes a distinct advantage over other 
female athletes because their bodies deviate from the “natural” or typical female range of 
testosterone. However, similar arguments can be made about numerous genetic abnormalities 
which are happily accepted in elite sport. Athletes with Marfan’s Syndrome are not excluded from 
sporting competitions, despite having a clinical condition which could provide a competitive 
advantage in sport, including above average height and limb lengths. Similarly, basketball players 
who have a hormonal condition called acromegaly that results in exceptionally large hands and feet 
are not required to undergo hormone therapy in order to level the playing field (Xavier and McGill, 
2012). Other examples include athletes such as Eero Maentyranta who won 3 gold medals in cross 
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country skiing at the 1964 Winter Olympics, ‘whose blood carries more haemoglobin and therefore 
more oxygen than that of the average male’ (Kayser, Mauron and Miah 2007, 2).  
 
It seems that none of the arguments above establish convincingly that testosterone-induced 
advantage in women’s sport is significantly different from other competitive advantages. As 
Karkazis et al. (2012, 11) put it:  
 
Even if some sort of evaluation were available that could decisively link hyperandrogenism 
to sporting ability (the traits of which would vary considerably by sport as well), 
hyperandrogenism should be viewed as no different from other biological advantages 
derived from exceptional biological variation. 
 
Attempts to justify the new policy on the grounds that HA eligibility rules are necessary in order to 
level the playing field seem inconclusive at best. In fact, it is just as possible that an athlete with HA 
would be disadvantaged. The interruption to training and the potential psychological and physical 
effects of the proposed evaluation and treatment of female athletes seem likely to outweigh any 
advantage. There is little evidence of a level playing field in women’s elite athletics and seemingly 
no means of normatively distinguishing between the alleged advantages enjoyed by female 
athletes with untypical testosterone levels and the array of other advantages in sport.  
 
Therefore, neither the putative testosterone-performance connection nor the normative outlawry 
of testosterone-induced female advantage is convincing. Neither gives traction in the establishment 
of policy about who is eligible to compete in female sport. To get this traction, we need to reflect 
upon our rationales for sex-segregated sport, and perhaps, again, cast out an old story as we do.  
 
What is Sex-Segregation in Sport About?  
 
The new IAAF and IOC policies seem underwritten by two assumptions: the first is that the 
disparity in performance between women and men is the raison d’etre of sex-segregated 
competition,18 and the second is that the said disparity is explained by the respective testosterone 
levels of women and men. We have already seen ample reason to doubt the second assumption. 
But the first, while it seems more innocent, might finally be comparable in ambitiousness to the 
second. The attempt to reduce the rationale of sex-segregated sport to one factor, performance-
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disparity or anything else, smells at the end of the day of the false reductionism inherent in the 
second assumption. An apparent reductio ad absurdum of this first assumption is seemingly 
provided by the earlier and luminously illustrated point (pp. 7-8) that there is in many sports swift 
overlap between the performances of men and women, yet males do not therefore compete with 
comparably performing females and nor is there a clamour for it to happen or a social feeling of 
injustice that it does not. Indeed, if victory prospects were the only consideration, there might be a 
compelling case for the best females to compete against males who are better but are realistically 
‘catchable’ with the practice of competition, a case which becomes yet stronger if the task-
orientation of self-improvement co-exists with the ego-orientation of winning (see Tannsjo 2000, 
105-07). 
 
It is true, for sure, that we cannot have sex-segregated competition for legitimate reasons 
and yet ignore those reasons. But this realisation, again, begs the question of exactly what those 
reasons are. It is, again, salutary to abjure our analytic taste for binary oppositions, essences and 
criteria, and entertain the prospect that there is no crisp, singular reason out there in physiological, 
psychological or indeed ludic nature which ontologically rubber-stamps our sex-segregated sport 
competition. Our social practices are rarely as hygienic as that. Nor should we expect them to be. 
We have sex-segregated competition for an arguably respectable collage of reasons, of which 
performance disparities are only one and quite possibly not the most important. Coggon, 
Hammond and Holm (2008) propose, for instance, a contingent rationale. This combines three 
separate arguments. The first fragments into two. The first part is that segregation provides more 
unpredictability and allows a wider range of performers to take part, since fewer women would 
swiftly or heavily lose under conditions of segregation. The second part is that segregated 
competition facilitates a richer range of skills and enjoyments, illustrated in ‘the markedly different 
style of men’s and women’s tennis’ (Coggon, Hammond and Holm 2008, 9). The second argument is 
that the absence of sex segregation courts a substantial constituency of irrevocably discouraged 
women. A third argument emphasises the contingently imperfect world in which we live. Women 
still suffer significant material and symbolic inequality which already restricts their participation and 
performance in sport. As Coggon et al. (2008), following Schneider (2000) put it, ‘…it is surely better 
to have an imperfect system that fits more happily in a world that is also imperfect than a 
philosophically perfect system that disadvantages 50 per cent of the population in the present 
(imperfect) world’.  
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Despite Coggon et al’s legitimate third argument, it is not clear that sex-segregated sport is 
essentially a symptom, even if it is so in the world we inhabit. As the preceding point about men’s 
and women’s tennis suggests, the segregation might survive the end of the material and symbolic 
inequalities to which it is a response. Sex-segregated sport might be (among other things) an 
example of what Janet Radcliffe Richards (1980, 186-90) characterises as innocuous cultural 
preferences, the end of which might significantly diminish the happiness of human beings. As she 
puts it, 
 
most people like cultural differences … furthermore, it is not just difference which is 
attractive, but its rooting in tradition … while feminists must be committed to attacking all 
cultural distinctions which actually degrade women, the indiscriminate pursuit of an 
androgynous culture must involve the elimination of innocuous cultural differences as well, 
and with them the source of a great deal of pleasure to many people … Of course it might 
be true that everyone would be happier if all sex-based culture disappeared; however it 
might equally be true that much happiness would be lost through its elimination. Any 
evidence on either side ought to be considered impartially. 
       
There are also, to be sure, related but separate banal practical reasons why we have sex-segregated 
sport. For instance, considerable inconveniences would arise, resulting from (for instance) the need 
for separate changing and showering facilities, if a team were mixed-sex. 
 
Once the messy, flexible, but generally respectable plurality of reasons (including 
performance levels) for sex-segregated sport is realised, the notion of elevating one quality such as 
testosterone levels (notwithstanding preceding difficulties) to sex classificatory status should look 
ever-more fragile. And, once the heavy and arguably innocuous role of cultural preference in sex-
segregated sport is appreciated, the case for allowing performers to compete a priori in the sex in 
which they have been acculturated – which is almost always their legal sex too – should be 
considered a very strong one. Buzuvis (2010, 39) proposes persuasively that the IOC and other 
athletic governing bodies abandon a rigid sex binary in favour of a more flexible approach ‘that 
allows athletes to participate in the category that is most consistent with, or at least most closely 
approximates, their gender identity.’ 
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Care should be taken to separate the immediately preceding question of how to apply sex 
categories in sex-segregated sport from the question of which sports should be sex-segregated. On 
the latter, Karkazis et al. (2012, 11) speak wisely:  
 
We expect the overall value of sex segregation is both sport specific and a moving target, as 
some differences may diminish as greater numbers of girls play sports at young ages and as 
opportunities for elite, including professional, competition expand for adult women. 
 
This approach echoes a recent approach to performance-enhancing drugs and devices such as that 
used by Oscar Pistorius (see Jones & Wilson 2009), i.e. there can be no general pro or anti-rationale 
or policy, only specific permissions and prohibitions for specific reasons. In the case of sex-
segregation, those reasons can, again, include robustly cultural ones (outrunning Karkazis et al’s 
above suggestion), which might, in turn, be sport-specific and a moving target.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The new IOC and IAAF policies on eligibility to compete in female sport are problematic on 
several counts. The criterion of testosterone level is freighted with dubious assumptions about the 
performative salience of testosterone, the normativity of testosterone-induced advantage and the 
rationale for sex-segregated sport competition.  
 
There is a cluster of reasons to believe that there is no robust connection between athletic 
performance and testosterone level. The argument that testosterone-induced advantage is ipso 
facto an unfair advantage in female competition is finally unconvincing. Given, also, the asymmetry 
of policy on female and male sport – the latter housing no conception of improper testosterone 
levels – the new policies appear grounded on old and oppressive ideological conceptions of what it 
means to be a woman (gender policing). 
 
The new IOC and IAAF policies are also inscribed with the belief that the disparity in athletic 
performance between women and men is the singular reason for sex-segregated sport. There are, 
again, very strong grounds for challenging this belief. More positively, it might well be that sex-
segregated sport is in substantial measure an innocuous cultural preference of both performers and 
spectators, and often a practical necessity. If so, this yields a strong case for allowing athletes to 
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compete in the sex category which most aligns with their gender identity, itself undetachable from 
their cultural history. Exactly which sports should be sex-segregated is, again, properly informed by 
performance and cultural elements, and is therefore, on both counts, sport-specific and a moving 
target.   
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1
 These include a medical ‘certificate of femininity’, ‘naked parades’, gynaecological examination, the Barr 
body sex-chromatin test and the DNA-based polymerase chain reaction (PCR) test. 
2
 For instance, at Atlanta 1996 eight women failed the IOC’s PCR test (see endnote 1), but were all allowed to 
compete after further examinations of ‘femaleness’ (and discussions) took place.   
3
 For instance, Spanish hurdler Maria Martinez-Patinio was excluded from the 1985 World University Games. 
She was reinstated three years later, but with a legacy of expulsion from her athletes’ residence, revocation of 
her sports scholarship, erasure of her running times from Spain’s athletics records, and the loss of friends,  
ﬁancé,’hope and energy’ (Martinez-Patinio 2005, S38).    
4
 Karkazis et al (2012, 6) put it: ‘It is often assumed that people with intersex traits are somehow exceptional 
because of their complex biologies, but sex is always complex. There are many biological markers of sex but 
none is decisive: that is, none is actually present in all people labelled male or female. Sex testing has been and 
continues to be problematic because there is no single physiological or biological marker that allows for the 
simple categorization of people as male or female’ (emphases in text). 
5
 http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Commissions_PDFfiles/Medical_commission/2012-06-22-IOC-
Regulations-on-Female-Hyperandrogenism-eng.pdf 
6
 One of the problems with relying on testosterone as the biological marker for determining eligibility is that 
testosterone differs in its effectiveness, depending on the sensitivity of an individual’s testosterone receptors. 
We return to this. 
7
 http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Commissions_PDFfiles/Medical_commission/2012-06-22-IOC-
Regulations-on-Female-Hyperandrogenism-eng.pdf 
8
 http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Commissions_PDFfiles/Medical_commission/2012-06-22-IOC-
Regulations-on-Female-Hyperandrogenism-eng.pdf 
9
  http://www.iaaf.org/about-iaaf/documents/medical 
10
 For compelling critique of the dichotomising impulse in general, see Kretchmar (2007) and Prokhovnik (1999: 
20-49). 
11
 http://www.iaaf.org/about-iaaf/documents/medical 
12
 http://www.iaaf.org/about-iaaf/documents/medical 
13
http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Commissions_PDFfiles/Medical_commission/2012-06-22-IOC-
Regulations-on-Female-Hyperandrogenism-eng.pdf 
14
 Viloria and Martinez-Patino (2012, 18) similarly suggest that ‘the implicit message to the women subjected 
to these policies is that they are not “female enough”’. 
15
 And see Warner (1994b), esp. 121-28. 
16
 Of Semenya, Time.com ran the headline, ‘Could This Women’s World Champ Be a Man?’ (Adams 2009) [in 
Karkazis et al. 2012] 
17
 For graphic and disturbing representation of males’ appetites for disempowering inconvenient women, see 
Warner (1994b, 28 and 50).  
18
 Tucker and Collins (2010, 138) endorse this assumption by stating that “gender categories exist for the very 
reason that performance differences between males and females require that two separate categories exist.” 
